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By using the concept of peripheralization 
as defined by Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 
(2013), I examine how processes of 
change in economy, demography, politi-
cal decision-making, and socio-cultural 
norms and values have marginalized 
Southern Yemen after 1990, and espe-
cially after the war of 1994. I will argue 
that politically produced spatial injustice 
has strengthened the desire for Southern 
Yemeni independence.
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Introduction
When the protests of the Southern Move-
ment (al-Hirak al-Janubi) started in 2007, 
activists called for solutions to the pre-
carious socio-economic situation in the 
country and for an end to the marginal-
ization of southern Yemenis in the cen-
tralized state after unity. After Yemeni 
state security forces reacted with vio-
lence, the social movement seeking eco-
nomic integration transformed into an 
umbrella movement of various groups, 
organizations and NGOs with a concrete 
political objective, that of state indepen-
dence of the former People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY). During the so-
called Arab Spring, the Southern Move-
ment perceived new opportunities for 
mobilization against (northern) “Yemeni 
Occupation,” as relations between north 
and south are often described in the 
southern political discourse.
Drawing near Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 
(2013), I examine the factors contributing 
to peripheralization (change in economy, 
demography, political decision-making, 
and socio-cultural norms and values) and 
how they have marginalized Southern 
Yemen after 1990, and especially after the 
war of 1994. These selected examples are 
the very often discussed themes in politi-
cal discourses of Southern Movement 
activists that encourage political mobili-
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zation in the south. Furthermore, some of 
the cases had enormous relevance on a 
national scale and were therefore dis-
cussed within the National Dialogue Con-
ference.1 I will argue that politically pro-
duced spatial injustice (Soja, “Seeking”) 
as the result of unequitable distribution 
of resources and opportunities has 
strengthened the desire for Southern 
Yemeni independence. 
In taking a critical geography perspective, 
I will show how spaces are socially pro-
duced on different scales. This article2 is 
based on field work in Aden, Abyan and 
Radfan (in the Lahij governorate), and a 
series of interviews with grassroots actors 
of the Southern Movement between 
March and May 2014 and in early 2015.3
Peripheralization in Yemen’s South and 
the Emergence of the Southern Move-
ment
This section contributes to an under-
standing of the emergence of the South-
ern Movement in 2007 by showing that 
its development is connected to pro-
cesses of peripheralization of Southern 
Yemen that predominantly began after 
the war in 1994.
The term “peripheralization” describes the 
process of becoming disconnected from, 
and dependent on, centers. In this sense, 
a periphery is “the outcome of complex 
processes of change in the economy, 
demography, political decision-making 
and socio-cultural norms and values” 
(Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 9). Peripher-
alization refers to a spatially organized 
inequality of power relations and access 
to material and symbolic goods that con-
struct and perpetuate the precedence of 
centers over areas that are marginalized 
(18). High levels of poverty associated with 
political and economic dependence on 
centers or other regions, decline or dis-
connection with respect to infrastructural 
networks and services, marginalization 
and stigmatization, as well as loss of 
opportunities and life chances articulate 
peripheralization (21). All of these dimen-
sions are expressions of social injustice, 
produced and perpetuated by structures 
that uphold the unequal distribution of 
power and inequitable access for some 
segments of society to economic and 
political decision-making bodies on a 
local, regional, national, supra-national, or 
global scale (22). In the following, I will 
analyze—based on selected examples—
processes of change that lead to periph-
eralization of Southern Yemen and that 
show expressions of “spatial injustice” 
(Soja, “Seeking”). Spatial (in)justice refers 
to an intentional and focused emphasis on 
the spatial aspects of justice and injustice. 
It involves the fair and equitable distribu-
tion in space of socially valued resources 
and the opportunities to use them. 
Processes of Change in the Economy
The discovery of oil in Hadhramaut and 
Marib was an influential factor in calls for 
Yemeni unity in the late 1980s. Oil had 
been found in the south in 1982 (Dresch 
161), but oil production in the southern 
region started on a commercial scale only 
after Yemeni unity in 1990 and has since 
been the driving force of Yemen’s econ-
omy. Approximately 80 percent of Yemen’s 
oil fields are situated in the southern gov-
ernorate of Hadhramaut (EIA). However, 
according to Bafana, the local residents 
have had no benefits in the form of the 
economic development of their region 
and, conversely, have suffered from pol-
luted ground water due to contamination 
from oil production. Southern oil has been 
exploited by the regime in Sanaa to the 
benefit of the patronage networks and 
associates of leading figures in that 
regime. As a result, and following the kill-
ing of the influential tribal Sheikh Saad bin 
Habrish al-Hamumi by a Yemeni soldier in 
late 2013, the Hadhrami Tribal Alliance 
mounted a limited insurgency against the 
Yemeni regime, its supporters in the 
region, and the army, claiming that they 
had all profited from Hadhrami oil reve-
nues for many years at the expense of 
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local people. This was accompanied by 
pressure on Yemeni and international oil 
companies in the region demanding that 
they employ more Hadhramis and offer 
supply and service contracts to local com-
panies. The Hadhrami Tribal Alliance also 
demanded that all security services for oil 
companies operating in the region should 
be provided by Hadhramis and demanded 
the withdrawal of the army (Bafana). When 
the government did not comply with these 
demands, there was an escalation of vio-
lence reaching the level of uprising. 
Geographically uneven “development”4 
and “underdevelopment” provide a frame 
of reference for understanding the pro-
cesses that produce injustices (Soja, “The 
City” 3). This is well exemplified by the Port 
of Aden. In the 1950s it was the second 
busiest harbor in the world after New York. 
As a British colonial port, Aden was con-
ceived by the British as a central point for 
trade between Europe and Asia, the Ara-
bian Peninsula, and East Africa. Six months 
before the independence of South Yemen 
in 1967, the port’s activity decreased by 75 
percent when the Suez Canal was closed 
during the Six Day Arab-Israeli War and it 
did not reopen until 1975 (Halliday 239). In 
1990, the Aden Container Terminal and 
the Aden Free Trade Zone were estab-
lished to attract international investment. 
In 2008, Dubai Ports World took over man-
agement of the Port of Aden. However, its 
ambitious aims to develop the economic 
growth of the port were never achieved, 
not least because Dubai Ports World did 
not keep its investment promises. Many in 
Aden perceived the contract as a bargain 
basement sale that only served the inter-
national strategy of Dubai Ports World. At 
the end of September 2012, the Yemeni 
government terminated the contract 
(Augustin). Despite being one of the big-
gest natural harbors of the world, Aden 
operates well below its potential due to 
inaction in Sanaa on essential structural 
reforms, establishing effective legal pro-
tection and developing infrastructure to 
adapt to changes in shipping require-
ments. Added to this is the piracy and lack 
of security in the Horn of Africa. Terrorist 
attacks such as the one on the USS Cole in 
2000 led to an increase in insurance pre-
miums and deterred shipping companies 
from using Aden. More recently, the ter-
rorism of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penin-
sula (AQAP) has exacerbated the prob-
lem: for several months in 2011 and 2012, 
Ansar al-Sharia, an AQAP offshoot, set up 
an Islamic Emirate in the governorate of 
Abyan, a mere fifty kilometers east of 
Aden.5 As a result, and due to competition 
from ports such as Dubai, Salalah and Dji-
bouti, Aden has lost its former significant 
position as a crucial harbor city and will 
struggle to restore it given that, due to its 
significant geographical position, it 
became the main battleground of the 
2015 war in Yemen.6
Processes of Change in the Demography
At the time of Yemeni unity in 1990, there 
was an enormous population imbalance 
between northern and southern regions. 
Though the two regimes agreed to share 
power equally during a transition period, 
southerners represented only approxi-
mately one quarter of the entire popula-
tion of the country. This imbalance rein-
forced peripheralization of the south and 
came into political relevance in the 1993 
elections. Despite the fact that the Yemeni 
Socialist Party (YSP) came in first by land-
slide in Southern Yemen, it only finished 
third behind President Ali Abdullah Salih’s 
General People’s Congress (GPC) and the 
Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah) 
(Al-Bab). These election results helped 
precipitate the crisis between the northern 
and southern leaderships that led to the 
1994 war, in which northern forces with the 
support of southern allies defeated the 
remnants of the PDRY armed forces.
In April 2014, southern Facebook groups 
headlined the news that in Abyan, north-
erners tried to obtain locally issued pass-
ports and identity cards (Alomanaa). The 
news presented it as an attempt to change 
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the demographic composition in the 
south prior to the holding of the referen-
dum on the planned new constitution that 
ultimately—due to the war—did not take 
place. There are doubts as to whether this 
actually happened and, indeed, if it hap-
pened, whether a change of population 
composition was its aim. The demographic 
imbalance between northern and south-
ern Yemen stokes fears that go back to the 
trauma of the 1993 elections, when the 
YSP lost its position as leading party. This 
story shows that anxieties of “occupation” 
and of marginalization are profoundly 
ingrained in southern Yemeni memories 
and discourses.
Processes of Change in Political Decision-
Making
Concerning southern Yemen, processes 
of change in political decision-making are 
the most profound reasons why Southern 
Yemen became peripheralized after unity. 
Thus, this section is the longest, although 
I selected only some examples. Despite 
the analytical value of Fischer-Tahir and 
Naumann’s conceptualization, ‘political 
decision making’ is not clearly defined. I 
therefore suggest that processes of 
change in political decision-making refer 
to large-scale institutionalized discrimina-
tion of southerners by Sanaa-ruled state 
bodies and institutions. After the 1994 
war, the institutionalized marginalization 
of southerners increased and became a 
source of spatial injustice. After its defeat 
over the south in 1994, the Sanaa regime 
decided to force most of military officers 
and soldiers as well as many civil servants 
from the south into retirement. Many of 
these southerners did not receive the 
appropriate pension;7 they and their chil-
dren became the basis of the Southern 
Movement in 2007. In 2013, Yemen estab-
lished a $1.2 billion fund to compensate 
southern state employees and soldiers for 
their financial losses after their retirement 
or dismissal following the 1994 war (Gho-
bari). This followed acceptance by the 
government—highlighted by discussions 
within the NDC—that southerners had jus-
tifiable grievances that had to be 
addressed. The compensation fund was 
only a partial, short-term response but 
was nevertheless important, even though 
it does not solve the deep economic 
problems of Yemen, which need long-
term solutions and radical reform. By 
2014, it seemed nearly impossible to solve 
all of the socio-economic problems in the 
poorest country of the Arab world. As 
noted above, the “southern cause”8 up to 
2007 was essentially one of economic 
marginalization. According to an econo-
mist of Aden University, the Southern 
Movement would not exist today had the 
state reacted immediately in 2007 with 
measures to reintegrate into the army and 
civil service the southerners who had 
been forced to retire after the 1994 war 
(University scholar, personal conversa-
tion). This locational discrimination is 
essential in the production of spatial injus-
tice and the creation of lasting spatial 
structures of privilege and advantage 
(Soja, “The City” 3). Furthermore, institu-
tionalized marginalization took place at 
governorate levels, where senior posi-
tions were awarded to northerners. South-
erners had less access, in general, to jobs 
than northerners, because during and 
after 1994, the army of the Sanaa regime 
looted and closed down most southern 
public sector companies and factories,9 
thus increasing unemployment (Dahl-
gren, “Southern Movement” 50). Even 
today businessmen complain that an 
investor who wants to establish a business 
or a factory in Southern Yemen faces more 
difficulties than he or she would find in the 
north. According to an influential Abyani, 
inducements have to be paid to govern-
ment officials or a partnership has to be 
offered to influential northern business-
men (Influential Abyani, personal conver-
sation). 
The political formation of space is a nota-
bly powerful source of spatial injustice 
(Soja, “The City” 3), which is observable in 
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the concentration of political decision-
making in Sanaa and which, for example, 
occurs in the educational sector. Before 
unity, many southerners had obtained 
scholarships from the PDRY government 
to study abroad; after unity, scholarships 
were limited (Dahlgren, “Southern Move-
ment” 51) and southerners found that it 
was very difficult to access them. They sur-
mised that this was largely because north-
ern elites corrupted the process. The 
same applied to civil service positions, 
including teachers. Teaching positions in 
today’s Yemen are principally obtained 
through an intermediary in Sanaa, who 
may want a bribe. Most young people 
wait for years after their university gradu-
ation to get jobs as civil servants, and the 
private sector is too weak to absorb them 
in a country where youth unemployment 
exceeds 50 percent. 
One of the most hotly debated issues con-
cerns land grievances in Southern Yemen. 
Problems of land ownership rights 
emerged after unity in 1990 and caused a 
great deal of conflict which is still ongoing 
today. The PDRY, following the takeover of 
power by the left wing of the National Lib-
eration Front in the “Glorious Corrective 
Move” of 1969, issued laws that dispos-
sessed influential families and former sul-
tans and benefited small holders and 
landless households. After 1990, much 
nationalized land was returned to previ-
ous owners or people pretending to be 
so. In addition, new decrees and invest-
ment regulations reorganized land owner-
ship. The 1991 “September Directive” facil-
itated the distribution of state land, but in 
some cases different government depart-
ments, such as the Ministry of Construc-
tion, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the 
General Investment Authority, distributed 
the same land plots to different people. 
Furthermore, these ministries and the 
regime distributed much land in the 
southern areas to supporters of the Sanaa 
regime, state employees, army officers, 
and civil servants (Pritzkat 66-67).10 
The before-mentioned Abyan War in 2011-
2012 destroyed much of the governorate’s 
capital Zinjibar and its surrounding areas. 
Grievances in Abyan were further exacer-
bated by a slow and inadequate govern-
ment program to repair the damages to 
Zinjibar and other areas and to relieve the 
plight of the people. The Yemeni govern-
ment promised to pay the refugees to 
help them rebuild their houses. However, 
according to a refugee from Zinjibar, some 
of the engineers responsible for assessing 
the damages to houses and calculating 
the amount of money that was to be paid 
to affected households demanded bribes 
to record the actual, or higher, costs of re-
construction for the houses on their lists 
(Zinjibar refugee, personal conversation). 
The government payments were to be 
made in three instalments. People 
received the first instalment but are still 
waiting for the second and third instal-
ments. Given their bad living conditions, 
on April 15, 2014, angry Abyanis blocked 
the road between Zinjibar and Aden to 
protest and demonstrate their resentment 
at the delay and the procedures used (Al-
Shair).
Processes of Change in Socio-Cultural 
Norms and Values
According to its socialist principles, the 
PDRY government implemented a num-
ber of social policies and provided a range 
of services to the population that became 
part of the daily life of PDRY citizens. At 
unity in 1990, the PDRY and Arab Republic 
of Yemen (YAR) had different levels of 
development with respect to their educa-
tion and health care systems, as well as on 
subsidies for food, jobs and housing. The 
socialist southern state had tried to abol-
ish tribalism, but after unity, the Sanaa 
regime encouraged tribalism fostered by 
the return of some of the previous ruling 
families of the pre-PDRY sultanates. In the 
PDRY, the influence of religion was 
restricted: it was not a matter for the state 
but for private individuals. Particularly after 
the 1994 war, southerners started to dis-
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cover and experience conservative Islam 
(Dahlgren, “Contesting Realities”). This 
notably manifested itself through the 
wearing of full veils and abayas for women 
and long beards for men. Sheikh 
ʿAbd al-Majid al-Zindani and his followers 
partly induced this change by asserting 
that southerners were infidels.11 People 
were afraid of being molested in the 
streets, attacked, or even killed; the mur-
der of at least 150 socialists between 1990 
and 1993 was probably the work of reli-
gious extremists (Brehony 188). Al-Zindani 
travelled to Southern Yemen after unity to 
spread his ideas among the youth in Fri-
day prayers. Young people were espe-
cially open to advice on the nature of the 
right path at a time of huge social trans-
formations in the south. Changes in life-
style took place: in 1994 Islamists demol-
ished the Aden brewery. By contrast, the 
government did not maintain the PDRY 
restrictions on qat consumption (it was 
allowed only on weekends in Aden), and 
as qat became available on a daily basis, 
its use spread to parts of the south where 
it had previously not been used. The pro-
gressive Family Law of the PDRY was 
replaced by the YAR’s conservative law 
right after unity, and women’s rights were 
also rigorously restricted (Dahlgren, “Con-
testing Realities”). The Ministry of Educa-
tion abolished school subjects such as 
music, sports and arts, and the two sub-
jects of Qurʾanic and Islamic studies 
replaced the subject religious studies. 
After the war, the ministry abolished 
mixed-sex schools as well. Furthermore, 
cinemas and theaters closed, as the state 
no longer subsidized cultural activities 
(Al-Khatib). 
The “southern cause” is an identity issue in 
addition to being a socio-economic and 
political one. With the emergence of the 
Southern Movement, the conception of 
the “South Arabian identity” became a 
basic discursive means to claim indepen-
dence. Among activists of the Southern 
Movement, the term “Yemeni” nowadays 
is only used with reference to northern 
Yemenis and is equated with backward-
ness and conservative thinking (Rogler 
28). “South Arabian identity” is based on 
the representations of the past and experi-
ences made during the period of British 
rule when it was commonly known as 
South Arabia. Narratives from the PDRY, 
for example, emphasize southerners’ abil-
ity to create a civil state. The socialists of 
the PDRY tried to rid the country of its 
colonial heritage by introducing the term 
“Yemen” into the state’s appellation, which 
activists of the Southern Movement reject 
today. The pan-Arab nationalism of the 
20th century is for many, especially young 
southerners, an outdated morass of con-
ceptions and ideas that brought the south 
to the present-day situation, in which 
southerners’ right to self-determination is 
ignored, as they are considered southern 
“Yemenis.” It is in this context that south-
erners go back to the appellation of 
“South Arabia.” This identity construction 
is predicated on the perception of being 
“occupied” by the north since the lost war 
of 1994. According to activists, it is the 
experience of large-scale marginalization 
after 1994, including spatial injustice, and 
the widespread perception in the south 
that the state is absent, as state structures 
and institutions are inactive, passive and 
ineffective, which promote the will for a 
return to independence (Southern Move-
ment activists, interviews).
Conclusion
Referring to Fischer-Tahir and Naumann, 
the developments in Aden and in the 
entire south designate the process of 
becoming disconnected from and 
dependent on centers, as seen in 
changes in economy, demography, polit-
ical decision-making, and last but not 
least, in processes of change in socio-
cultural norms and values. High levels of 
poverty, decline of infrastructural net-
works and services, marginalization and 
stigmatization of southerners, as well as 
loss of life opportunities and insecurity 
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are part of the daily life of most southern-
ers and have thus contributed to the 
emergence and consolidation of the 
Southern Movement in Yemen. All of 
these dimensions express spatial injus-
tice, produced by structures of unequal 
power distribution and inequitable 
access for most southerners to economic 
and political decision-making bodies on 
various scales.
3 Other than open structured 
and narrative interviews with 
Southern Movement activists 
of various ages originating 
from all southern Yemeni 
governorates, I undertook 
participant observations 
during their demonstrations, 
lectures, as well as during 
private meetings. These 
observed demonstrations 
and lectures took part in 
Aden’s quarters of Crater, 
Tawahi, Qalluʾa, al-Muʾalla, 
Khor Maksar and al-Mansura. 
4 In Uneven Development: 
Nature, Capital and the 
Production of Space (1984), 
Neil Smith conceptualizes 
the production of spatial 
and temporal unevenness. 
He calls “uneven 
development […] the 
concrete manifestation of the 
production of space under 
capitalism” (90). Uneven 
development results from the 
investment of capital in the 
built environments in certain 
areas, while investment in 
other areas remains absent.
Notes
1 The NDC resulted from the 
Gulf Cooperation Council’s 
Initiative that initiated the 
transitional processes in 
Yemen in late 2011. The NDC 
started on March 18, 2013 
and ended in January 2014. 
The principal stakeholders 
of the Southern Movement 
rejected their participation in 
the NDC, because the Sanaa 
regime under President 
Hadi and the international 
community excluded the 
right for self-determination of 
southerners before the talks 
began.
2 I discussed parts of this 
paper during the workshop 
“The Future of Yemen: 
Between Fragility and 
Freedom” of the German 
Orient Institute in December 
2013 and during the 
workshop “Future of Yemen” 
at the Gulf Research Meeting 
in Cambridge in August 2014.
5 Ansar al-Sharia—a group 
linked to AQAP—took over 
the city of Jaar in Abyan for 
close to a year in 2011-2012 
following the withdrawal of 
security forces to the north as 
a result of the confrontation 
between President Salih 
on the one hand and Ali 
Muhsin al-Ahmar (Salih’s 
former senior Yemeni 
military commander and 
close associate who, on 
March 18, 2011, declared 
his opposition to him) and 
the al-Ahmar faction (a 
family which belongs to the 
northern Yemeni Hashid 
tribal confederation and 
is strongly involved with 
ruling the Islah party) on 
the other came close to civil 
war. Salih needed his troops 
closer to the capital. The 
Ansar al-Sharia grasped the 
opportunity of this power 
vacuum to establish its 
Emirate of Waqar in Jaar. As 
a result, more than 100,000 
people were displaced, and 
most of them sought refuge 
in Aden. Those without 
money stayed in schools; 
others rented flats. More 
were forced to flee as a result 
of the fighting that took place 
when the Yemeni armed 
forces—supported by US 
drone and missile strikes—re-
captured the territory.
6 The military intervention 
in Yemen began on March 
26, 2015, with Saudi Arabia’s 
air strikes under the name 
“Decisive Storm,” with 
support from a coalition of 
GCC states (except Oman), 
Pakistan, Jordan, Sudan, 
Egypt, and Morocco. The 
Houthis forced President 
Hadi to resign from office 
in January 2015 and put 
him under house arrest. 
Six weeks later, in February 
2015, he fled to Aden, 
where he withdrew from his 
resignation. Internally, Houthi 
militias and loyalists of Ali 
Abdullah Salih advanced 
southward to take over all of 
Yemen. Hadi fled to Saudi 
Arabia, when the Houthi and 
Saleh militias entered Aden. 
There, he asked for support 
and the coalition began to 
bomb Yemen. Aden and 
the surrounding southern 
governorates became the 
principal battleground of this 
war. The southern resistance, 
in which the segments of 
the Southern Movement are 
integrated, liberated Aden 
from the Houthi and the Salih 
militias on July 14, 2015.
7 For further details, 
see International Crisis 
Group, “Yemen’s Southern 
Question,” “Breaking Point?”; 
Dahlgren, “The Snake,” “The 
Southern Movement.”
8 The “southern cause” 
(al-qadiyya al-janubiyya) 
refers to the resistance to the 
marginalization of southern 
Yemenis after the PDRY’s 
unification with the Yemen 
Arab Republic (YAR) in 1990. 
Both the marginalization and 
the subsequent resistance 
intensified after the war 
between the north and south 
in 1994 in which the north 
won.
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